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Abstract
While previous research has yielded evidence for the impact of justice perceptions
on tax compliance, the findings were not always consistent. The present paper
suggests a more differentiated view on the basis of two congenial justice theories.
These theories argue that taxpayers are more concerned about procedural and
distributive justice, and less about personal outcomes, when they identify strongly
with the inclusive category within which procedures and distributions apply.
Regression analyses of survey data from 2040 Australian citizens showed that two
forms of tax compliance (pay income reporting and tax minimisation) were
determined by self-interest variables. For two other forms (non-pay income and
deductions), inclusive identification had an additional effect and moderated the
effects of self-interest and justice variables as predicted. Implications for theories of
justice motivation and the practice of compliance enforcement are discussed.
1The impact of outcome orientation and justice concerns on tax compliance: The role of
taxpayers’ identity.
Michael Wenzel
Human life is organised in various more or less abstract collectives, from families, clubs,
work organisations and communities to nations and supranational associations. These
collectives have their own goals, agendas and policies. Their realisation, however, depends
on contributions from and cooperation between members. Rules and laws may explicitly
prescribe such contributions and cooperation, but they are ineffectual if not obeyed. Non-
compliance jeopardises the collective project and, at least from the point of view of the
collective, can be utterly destructive.
A prime example is non-compliance in the area of taxation (Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein,
1998). A tax system is meant to provide the revenue necessary for pursuing collective goals
like social security, economic prosperity and redistribution of wealth, internal and national
safety, and cultural life. Non-compliance not only jeopardises funding for these projects, but
insofar as it differs between social groups, non-compliance may also directly contribute to
social inequality. Tax non-compliance is indeed considered a significant problem, even
though its magnitude can only be estimated. For instance, for the year 1992, the United
States Internal Revenue Service estimated a gross individual income tax gap (that is, the
difference between individual income taxes owed and taxes paid voluntarily and on time) of
$93 billion to $95 billion (Internal Revenue Service, 1997). This translates into an individual
non-compliance rate of 17%, whereas 83% of taxes owed were paid voluntarily and on time.
The problem of tax non-compliance is substantial and has therefore stimulated a lot of
research into the underlying factors and processes (Roth, Scholz & Witte, 1989). This
research has been dominated by economic models that conceive of taxpayers as rational
actors who are basically (non)compliant if this pays off for them (e.g., Allingham &
Sandmo, 1972). However, more recent research pointed to the limitations of this perspective
and the relevance of more social factors like norms, trust and morality (e.g., Cowell, 1992;
Cullis & Lewis, 1997; Gordon, 1989; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Scholz & Lubell, 1998).
More specifically, researchers stressed the role of perceptions of justice and fairness, finding
that taxpayers are less likely to be compliant with a tax system they consider unjust, unfair
2and thus illegitimate (e.g., Alm, Jackson & McKee, 1993; Cowell, 1992; Falkinger, 1995;
Kinsey, Grasmick & Smith, 1991; Roberts & Hite, 1994).
Not surprisingly, empirical research was mainly concerned with demonstrating the general
relevance of social factors such as perceived justice and fairness. However, it now seems
vital to address the more precise conditions of their relevance. When do justice concerns
matter more than factors of individual outcome maximisation? For whom is the justice of the
tax system relevant and why? We cannot assume that processes of tax compliance are the
same for all taxpayers and under all conditions, implying the need for responsive regulation
(Braithwaite & Braithwaite, 2000). The present research attempts to contribute to the
theoretical differentiation required. It builds particularly on recent theories of procedural and
distributive justice that stress the role of social identity for justice motivation versus outcome
orientation.
The attempted differentiation will be threefold. First, we will distinguish between various
aspects of instrumental and justice considerations and test for their comparative predictive
value for tax compliance. Second, we will distinguish between various forms of tax
compliance and test for the generality of the effects. Third, we will test for the moderating
impact of taxpayers social identity in terms of the inclusive category within which the tax
system is applied; namely, the nation.
Forms of tax compliance
Researchers usually distinguish between tax non-compliance and tax evasion. Evasion refers
to deliberate criminal non-fulfilment of tax liabilities, whereas non-compliance is a broader
term and also includes unintended (although still unlawful) failure to meet tax obligations,
for instance, due to misinformation, misunderstanding or calculation errors (Hessing,
Kinsey, Elffers & Weigel, 1988). However, the distinction is not always clear, for instance,
in cases where taxpayers try to bend the rules and find loopholes with the intention of paying
less tax (against the spirit of the rules) while not wanting to do something illegal (according
to the letter of the law). In the present research we are concerned with intentional taxpaying
behaviour (on which respondents can give self-reports) and define it as non-compliant if it
is not favourable to the tax system and thus non-cooperative towards the collective. Its
primary form is of course tax evasion.
3However, even types of tax evasion may be further differentiated, not only because different
types may be available to different groups of taxpayers, but also because these types could
have different qualities and involve different processes. Interventions to increase compliance
would then have to be specifically addressed at each of these types of tax evasion (Kidder &
McEwen, 1989). First, while some acts of evasion involve an unlawful commission (e.g., a
false statement on deductions), others may involve an omission (e.g., not reporting some
cash income); the latter could be considered less serious (Christensen & Hite, 1997; see also
Kahneman & Miller, 1986). Second, perceptions of lawfulness and legitimacy can diverge
(objective vs. subjective justice; see Lind & Tyler, 1988). While people may find some
unlawful acts of evasion illegitimate according to their concept of right and wrong (e.g.,
exaggerating deductions), they may consider some laws to be wrong and regard respective
acts of evasion, even though unlawful, as morally justified (e.g., under-reporting social
security allowances). Third, some acts of evasion may be clearly illegal whereas others may
be borderline cases and their illegality unclear (e.g., certain tax minimisation strategies).
The present study will not be concerned with a conceptual differentiation of forms of tax
compliance; this task has been undertaken elsewhere (Braithwaite, Reinhart, Braithwaite &
Williams, 2001). However, multiple forms of tax compliance will be investigated in parallel
to test for differential versus consistent effects of the predictor variables. Similar effects
would suggest generality of the processes underlying tax compliance. Differing effects
would suggest that the processes have more to do with specific circumstances of the various
forms, which would thus have to be taken into account for an understanding of the
processes. The present research used a variety of measures of tax non-compliance, from
under-reporting of various forms of income to exaggerations of deduction and rebate claims,
and the pursuit of tax minimisation strategies.
The rational actor
Most research on tax evasion follows an economic self-interest model as initially outlined by
Allingham and Sandmo (1972). It understands taxpayers as rational actors who want to
maximise their individual outcomes. The taxpayers choice is between compliance, with a
certain loss in the form of the taxes paid, and tax evasion, with the chance of a relative gain
if the evasion is undetected or of an even greater loss if the evasion is detected and
4penalised. In line with the model, empirical studies found that tax compliance increased with
detection probability or audit probability (note that the latter does not strictly imply
detection; e.g., De Juan, Lasheras & Mayo, 1994; Friedland, 1982; Kinsey & Grasmick,
1993; Mason & Calvin, 1984; Webley & Halstead, 1986). However, there were also some
negative findings (Dubin, Graetz & Wilde, 1987; Dubin & Wilde, 1988; for a critical review,
see Fischer, Wartick & Mark, 1992). There is also some evidence that tax compliance
increases with penalty rates (De Juan et al., 1994; Friedland, Maital & Rutenberg, 1978;
Klepper & Nagin, 1989; Schwartz & Orleans, 1967). However, the evidence is even more
ambiguous on this question (Friedland, 1982; Spicer & Lundstedt, 1976; Varma & Doob,
1998).
Despite its apparent plausibility, the self-interest model and its implied regulatory approach
of deterrence may be criticised for its one-sided focus on individual outcome maximisation
(see Lewis, 1982). It ignores the fact that voluntary tax compliance requires some degree of
cooperation between taxpayers and tax authorities that may be undermined by a heavy-
handed regulatory approach (Sheffrin & Triest, 1992; Strümpel, 1969). Furthermore, the
self-interest model is overly individualistic (Cowell, 1992) in that it denies that taxpayers
might not only be concerned with their individual outcomes, but also with their social
reputation (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990), the tax-funded outcomes for the collective (Alm et
al., 1993) and justice and fairness (Kinsey et al., 1991). Thus the important question is:
When are taxpayers primarily interested in maximising their individual outcomes by evading
taxes while avoiding penalties, and when is their taxpaying behaviour based more on social
motives?
Taxpaying behaviour can be regarded as a social dilemma (Dawes, 1980) where it appears
economically most rational for individuals to evade taxes if possible and yet profit from the
public goods funded by the tax system. However, if all individuals followed this rationality,
the tax system would collapse, public goods would not be available and everybody would be
even worse off than if they cooperated by paying their taxes (Elffers, 2000; Weigel, Hessing
& Elffers, 1987). Social psychological research on cooperation and social dilemmas suggests
that cooperation is greater when participants share membership in a relevant social group
(Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Brewer & Schneider, 1990). In fact, it is argued that social
identification transforms the self and thus actual self-interest, with a more collective self-
5definition implying a greater concern for outcomes of the collective and the welfare of other
members of the collective (Brewer, 1991; Morrison, 1997).
In the context of taxation, it is therefore predicted that (hypothesis 1) identification with the
collective to which taxes are contributed and within which public goods are shared, that is
national identification, will be related to more cooperative taxpaying behaviour and
compliance. Following the self-interest model, (hypothesis 2a) deterrence and outcome
favourability should increase tax compliance. However, assuming that collective
identification transforms self-interest so that taxpayers are less concerned with maximising
their immediate individual outcomes, it is predicted more specifically that (hypothesis 2b)
deterrence and individual outcome favourability will have a more positive impact on tax
compliance when taxpayers identify less rather than more strongly with the relevant
collective (i.e., their nation). In the present study, deterrence follows an expectancy-value
model and is conceptualised as a multiplicative combination of perceived probability of
detection, perceived probability of certain legal consequences and the evaluation of the
severity of these consequences. While deterrence refers to anticipated consequences of non-
compliance and may be conceived of as reactive, a more proactive aspect of individual self-
interest is the perceived favourability of the tax system for oneself, or the degree to which
decisions of the tax authority are favourable to oneself. The more taxpayers think tax
decisions are (already) favourable to themselves, the less they should expect to gain from tax
non-compliance. Despite the differentiation between proactive and reactive self-interest
considerations, there is no theoretical reason why hypotheses 2a and 2b should not hold for
both outcome favourability and deterrence.
Whether in regard to individual or collective self-interest, so far we have assumed that
taxpayers would be solely concerned about maximising their self-interest (even though in
relation to differently defined selves and self-interests). However, taxpayers may also be
concerned with issues of justice and fairness.
6Concerns for procedural justice
There is strong evidence across various contexts that perceived fairness of the procedures
involved in decision-making and allocation processes affect general satisfaction, support for
decision-makers and allocators, and acceptance of, or compliance with, the decision (see
Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith & Huo, 1997). In an early approach to procedural justice, Thibaut
and Walker (1975) viewed process and decision control as core criteria of procedural
fairness; that is, the possibility to voice ones view and to have an input in the final decision,
respectively. People would desire process and decision control because it would give them
control over outcomes. From this perspective, procedural justice would not be truly
independent from self-interest, but rather instrumental to outcome maximisation. More
recently, Lind and Tyler (1988) criticised the instrumental account for its limitations; for
instance, it cannot account for procedural justice effects that are by methodological design
independent from outcomes (Lind, Kanfer & Earley, 1990). Based on social identity theory
(Tajfel & Turner, 1986), Lind and Tyler argue that people want to be treated fairly as
members of a group they share with the decision-maker, because fair treatment
acknowledges their membership and status in the group and maintains the values of the
group. The group value approach (Tyler, 1989, 1994; Tyler et al., 1997; Tyler & Smith,
1999) thus argues that procedural justice  in terms of neutrality, trustworthiness and respect
(or status recognition)  is sought out of relational concerns about ones relationship to
group representatives and ones social identity as a member of the group.
Importantly, the group value approach allows for the prediction that a procedural justice
motivation arising from relational concerns depends on ones degree of identification with
the social category that the authorities represent and within which the procedures are applied
(Huo, Smith, Tyler & Lind, 1996; Smith & Tyler, 1996). People should be concerned about
procedural justice only as an indicator of their inclusion and status within their group when
they identify with the group and their group membership relevant to their self-concept.
There are few studies so far on the impact of procedural fairness on tax compliance. Using a
survey method, Porcano (1988) investigated the impact of procedural justice, relative to a
number of other variables, on hypothetical or self-reported tax evasion. Procedural justice
was measured by three items, asking whether taxpayers had some input in formulating tax
7laws, whether the input should be greater and whether the enforcement procedures employed
by the tax authority were fair. Procedural justice did not contribute significantly to the
discrimination between evaders and non-evaders as far as the hypothetical situation was
concerned; self-reported past evaders even perceived the tax system to be procedurally fairer
than non-evaders did. A simulation study by Alm et al. (1993) investigated experimentally
whether procedural qualities of the decision of how tax revenue should be spent affected tax
compliance. As predicted, there was less tax compliance when the decision was imposed on
the participants rather than based on a (presumably fairer) majority rule. Similarly, in a
scenario study by Tyler, Rasinski and Spodick (1985), the opportunity to voice ones opinion
to a city council about the allocation of tax money positively affected perceptions of fairness
of the decision process and evaluations of the council. This was the case even when there
was no decision control and thus presumably little instrumental motivation (although, of
course, through voicing their opinion people would hope to influence the decision).
However, compliance was not an issue in this study. Likewise, other studies investigated
criteria of procedural fairness applied in the area of taxation but not their effects on tax
compliance (e.g., Magner, Johnson, Sobery & Welker, 2000; Stalans & Lind, 1997).
The present study will investigate the impact of perceived procedural fairness on tax
compliance, while controlling for outcome favourability and instrumental considerations (as
discussed in the previous paragraph). In line with the strong evidence in other areas, it is
predicted that (hypothesis 3a) perceived procedural justice will be related to tax compliance.
Furthermore, we follow the group value approach in its more specific assumption concerning
the role of inclusive social identity and predict that (hypothesis 3b) perceived procedural
justice will have a more positive impact on tax compliance when taxpayers identify more
rather than less strongly with the relevant inclusive category (i.e., the nation).
Concerns for distributive justice
Even more so than procedural justice, distributive justice has been traditionally
conceptualised as secondary or derivative to instrumental considerations (e.g., Walster,
Walster & Berscheid, 1978; see Tyler & Smith, 1998; Wenzel, 2000a). However, more
recently Wenzel (2000a, 2000b, in press) proposed an approach to distributive justice, based
on self-categorisation theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987), that
complements very well the group value approach to procedural justice.
8The categorisation approach assumes that distributive justice involves categorisation
processes on various levels of abstraction. Central is the inclusive category of all those
considered potential recipients of the distribution. Non-differentiating justice notions (e.g.,
equality; see Cohen, 1987) are derived from the perception that all potential recipients are
the same, in that they share membership in the inclusive category and are thus equally
deserving (in an identity-defining way; Wenzel, 2000a). Conversely, equal treatment
confirms their inclusion in this social category. Differentiating justice notions (e.g., equity;
see Cohen, 1987) are derived from the perception that the potential recipients are differently
prototypical for the inclusive category and represent to different degrees important values of
that category (Wenzel, in press). Conversely, the differential treatment confirms the
importance of the respective value dimension for the social category. In either situation, it is
identification in terms of the inclusive category that motivates people towards justice, even
at the cost of individual or group interest (Wenzel, 2000b).
A number of studies have investigated the impact of perceptions of distributive justice on tax
compliance; too many to review them all here. The findings are quite mixed. An integration
of the findings is further complicated by the fact that taxation involves various aspects of
distributive justice, while most studies select only one or a few of them, or use overall
ratings of fairness. First, there is the fairness of ones tax burden relative to others; either
ones personal tax burden compared to similar others (horizontal equity; Kinsey &
Grasmick, 1993) or (largely neglected so far) the tax burden of ones group compared to
other groups. For instance, Spicer and Becker (1980) found in a simulation study that
disadvantageous inequity increased tax evasion and advantageous inequity decreased tax
evasion (for a similar result using a survey methodology, see De Juan et al., 1994). Webley,
Robben and Morris (1988) manipulated participants relative tax-free allowances in a similar
fashion but found no effect on tax evasion.
Second, there is the fairness of the relative tax burdens on different societal groups or strata
(vertical equity; Kinsey & Grasmick, 1993). This issue does not concern ones personal or
group treatment but rather the overall distribution of fair tax burdens across the collective as
a whole; it is thus an aspect of macrojustice (Brickman, Folger, Goode & Schul, 1981). A
related issue, not addressed in the present study, refers to the fairness of progressivity of the
9tax rates (Hite & Roberts, 1991; Roberts & Hite, 1994). Using survey procedures, Kinsey
and Grasmick (1993) found significant effects of vertical unfairness (and unfairness of
progressivity) on future intentions of tax cheating, whereas Porcano (1988), using a different
and possibly less specific measure, did not find significant effects on hypothetical or past
evasion.
Third, there is the issue of fairness of the taxpayer-government exchange. This could be
conceptualised as an aspect of microjustice (Brickman et al., 1981) when individuals or
groups of taxpayers evaluate whether the government benefits and services they receive are a
fair return for the taxes they pay, compared to the benefits received and taxes paid by others.
For instance, Porcano (1988) found that self-reported past evaders perceived the exchange
relationship as more unfair than non-evaders did. In the present research, however, the
taxpayer-government exchange will be conceptualised as an aspect of macrojustice
(Brickman et al., 1981). Taxpayers will be asked to evaluate government spending, overall
and across a range of areas, irrespective of the benefits they receive and the taxes they pay.
For instance, Wallschutzky (1984) used an overall indicator for macrojustice exchange but
did not find a significant difference between convicted evaders and a control group (nor did
he find a difference for microjustice exchange indicators).
Finally, using an overall rating, Song and Yarbrough (1978) found a significant relationship
between perceived fairness of the tax system and tax ethics, whereas Kaplan and Reckers
(1985) found no effect on evasion intention or recommended penalties for evasion. Roberts
and Hite (1994) even found an unpredicted positive relationship between overall fairness and
admitted past non-compliance.
Unpredicted results like the latter suggest a more critical consideration of methodological
issues. Generally, correlational analyses of survey data may of course always have the
possible problem of omitted variables. More specifically, in the present context, fairness and
justice judgments may be correlated with outcome favourability (as justice judgments are
often self-serving and egocentric; Messick & Sentis, 1983; Walster et al., 1978). In the
present study we will therefore control statistically for outcome favourability and
instrumental considerations in order to establish the unique effects of justice and fairness.
Furthermore, distributive justice is often operationalised as a bipolar dimension, from
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unfavourable inequity over equity to favourable inequity, and is thus inherently confounded
with instrumental concerns (e.g., Spicer & Becker, 1980; Webley et al., 1988). A true effect
of justice would be reflected in a curvilinear relationship between this bipolar dimension and
tax compliance, with compliance being greatest at the point of equity. The present study used
a bipolar measure for microjustice, but the measure was squared (and the linear effect
controlled for) in order to test for the curvilinear relationship and thus the effect of genuine
justice.
Given the somewhat inconsistent findings in the literature, the categorisation approach
(Wenzel, 2000a, 2000b, in press), with its more specific predictions about justice
motivation, seems promising for a further clarification of the role of distributive justice for
tax compliance. It is predicted that (hypothesis 4a) perceptions of distributive justice
(microjustice and macrojustice) will be related to tax compliance. However, following the
categorisation approach, (hypothesis 4b) perceived distributive justice will have a more
positive impact on tax compliance when taxpayers identify more rather than less strongly
with the relevant inclusive category (i.e., their nation).
Method
Participants
The predictions were tested on the basis of data from the Community, Hopes, Fears and
Action Survey (Braithwaite, 2000). The self-completion questionnaire was sent to a sample
of 7754 Australian citizens drawn from the Australian electoral roll. From each state and
territory a sample was randomly selected according to the ratio of enrolled electors of that
state or territory relative to the total number. After subtracting cases such as where the mail
was returned to sender or addressees were deceased, 7003 questionnaires were effectively
sent out (for procedural details, see Mearns & Braithwaite, 2001). After repeated appeals for
participation (see below), 2040 respondents, or 29%, returned their questionnaires. The
response rate for this rather long questionnaire thus compares with experiences from other
mail surveys on tax issues in Australia (Wallschutzky, 1984). Wallschutzky (1996) argues
that tax surveys of the general population cannot be expected to yield a higher than 30% to
40% response rate. The participants in the final sample were aged between 18 and 88 years
(Md = 48); 949 were male, 1074 were female and 17 did not indicate their sex. Concerning
11
occupational status, 851 were employed full time, 350 part time, 91 unemployed, 380 retired
from work, 54 full-time students and 274 keeping house (there were 40 cases with missing
details). Their average family income of the previous year was about A$49 000 (currently
about US$27 000).
Procedure
A professional social survey company conducted the data collection. The questionnaire was
sent to respondents, together with a reply-paid envelope and an accompanying letter signed
by the director of the research centre. The letter explained the intent of the study and the
relationship with the Australian Taxation Office (Tax Office), and guaranteed strict
confidentiality of responses. An identification number on the questionnaire allowed a
targeted follow-up of cases where the questionnaire was not returned by a certain deadline.
That is, where the questionnaire was not returned within about two weeks, a reminder
postcard was sent out to these respondents, asking again for participation in the study. The
procedure was repeated after another two weeks. About a month later, a new questionnaire
was sent out to those who still had not returned their questionnaire and who might have lost
it or thrown it away. Non-responders were sent reminder letters twice. This procedure aimed
to ensure a reasonable response rate for a relatively long questionnaire on a sensitive issue.
Excluding breaks, which were explicitly recommended at various stages of the
questionnaire, respondents would have needed an estimated 1.5 hours to fill it in.
Questionnaire
The present paper deals with those survey questions relevant to six categories of variables:
tax compliance, inclusive (national) identification, outcome considerations, procedural
justice, distributive justice and demographic control variables.
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Tax compliance
A number of measures with different response formats were used to measure various aspects
of tax non-compliance. For the sake of economy, the present paper does not investigate non-
lodgment or outstanding payments as instances of non-compliance (see Braithwaite et al.,
2001). The items of the present study referred to the under-declaration of various forms of
income (i.e., earnings, cash income, government payments, interest and dividends),
exaggerated claims for deductions and rebates and general engagement in tax planning and
use of specific forms of tax minimisation. Exact wording and formats of the items are given
in the appendix.
Inclusive identification
Two items measured inclusive identification, that is, national identification as Australians
(see Haslam, 2001): Being a member of the Australian community is important to me and
I feel a sense of pride in being a member of the Australian community (1 = do not agree at
all, 7 = agree completely). The items were highly correlated (r = .87) and thus scores were
averaged to obtain a measure of inclusive identification. However, the measure was highly
skewed and truncated at the pole of high identification; 65% of respondents had a score of 6,
6.5 or 7 (Mn = 6, M = 5.86). A large portion of the variance in inclusive identification would
thus be located at the high identification end of the scale, which would be inappropriate for
tests of predictions about the impact of a high versus low degree of inclusive identification.
Therefore, the measure was dichotomised, with scores lower than or equal to the midpoint of
the scale (4) defined as low identification (n = 250) and scores greater than the midpoint of
the scale defined as high identification (n = 1718).1
                                                          
1 Dichotomization of variables is often criticized for loss of information. The reason for using the
procedure in the present context may be conceived of as focussing on the relevant information,
given the empirical peculiarities of the variable. It is less relevant whether respondents indicated
scale points 6 or 7 for their degree of identification (this might rather reflect some personal
preference for extreme or less extreme responses); more meaningful and important is whether
respondents tended towards the one or the other end of the identification scale. However,
variance in this respect would be diluted by the variance of a large number of cases at the upper
end of the scale, if the original scale would be used.
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Outcome considerations
In the introduction, proactive and reactive aspects of self-interest, or outcome orientation,
were distinguished. The reactive aspect refers to the perceived risk of being caught and
punished for evading tax; the extent to which one feels deterred from tax evasion. Following
an expectancy-value model, deterrence was defined as the product of perceived probability
of detection, perceived probability of certain legal consequences and the evaluation of the
severity of these consequences. The measurement of deterrence used a modified form of the
measures of Varma and Doob (1998). The precise wording and format of the questions are
given in the appendix. This procedure was followed for two instances of tax evasion,
namely, under-reporting of cash income and untruthful claims for work-related expenses
(deductions). Hence we obtained a deterrence measure for both under-reporting of cash
income and exaggerations of deductions. The measures were highly correlated (r = .74).
The proactive aspect of self-interest refers to the perceived outcome favourability to oneself
of the tax authoritys decisions. Items were adopted from research on the group value model
(e.g., Tyler, 1997): How often do you agree with the decisions made by the Tax Office?
and How often are the decisions of the Tax Office favourable to you? (1 = almost never, 5
= almost always). The measures were highly correlated (r = .65).
Procedural justice
Procedural justice was conceptualised in line with the group value approach. The
formulation of the measures followed previous research in this area (e.g., Tyler, 1997) with
its distinction between the sub-concepts of respect (e.g., The Tax Office respects the
individuals rights as a citizen), trustworthiness (e.g., The Tax Office considers the
concerns of average citizens when making decisions) and neutrality (e.g., The Tax Office
gives equal consideration to the views of all Australians). Again, the appendix contains a
complete list of the measures.
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Distributive justice
The present study investigated issues of microjustice and macrojustice (Brickman et al.,
1981). With regard to issues of microjustice, two questions using the same format measured
perceived fairness of the tax burden of oneself and the tax burden of ones
industry/occupation group: In your opinion, do the following people/groups pay their fair
share of tax? (a) You, yourself (b) your industry/occupation group (1 = much more than
their fair share, 2 = a bit more, 3 = about their fair share, 4 = a bit less, 5 = much more than
their fair share). For another indicator, respondents were asked about a group they
considered relevant: Think about the people who are in the same boat as you when it comes
to paying tax. In your opinion, do they pay ? (with the same response options as before).
With regard to issues of macrojustice, respondents were asked to rate for 16 societal
categories (e.g., owner-managers of large companies, senior judges and barristers, unskilled
factory workers) the extent to which they paid their fair share (again using the same scale;
see appendix). Following the procedure used by Kinsey and Grasmick (1993), for each
respondent the standard deviation over these ratings was calculated and used as an indicator
for vertical justice. A low standard deviation means that the tax burdens of the different
groups were judged similarly fair or unfair; hence unfairness would be distributed equally
over the society and there would be few relative advantages of certain groups in that regard.
A high standard deviation, by contrast, indicates large differences in perceived fairness of the
tax burdens and thus an unfair distribution of tax fairness.
A second issue of macrojustice referred to government spending. The government spends
taxpayers money in many different areas. Below are just a few of these areas. For each area,
do you think the government should be spending less money, keeping things as they are, or
spending more money? A list of areas followed (see appendix); for example, education,
defence (1 = much less, 2 = less, 3 = same, 4 = more, 5 = much more). For the purpose of the
analyses reported in this paper, the measure was recoded into scores of 3, 2, 1, 2 and 3
respectively, to obtain a measure of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with government spending.
Another single item represented a global measure of the same issue: Overall, how
dissatisfied or satisfied are you with the way the government spends taxpayers money? (1 =
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dissatisfied, 5 = satisfied; reverse-coded). The two measures were significantly correlated
with each other (r = .31).
Background variables
Respondents were asked to indicate their age, sex (1 = male, 2 = female), personal income
and family income (each on a scale from none, 5, 10, 15, etc. to 75, 100, 250+ thousand
dollars).
Results
Factor analyses
Tax compliance
In order to group variables measuring similar behavioural dispositions toward tax
compliance, the 14 compliance measures used in this study were factor-analysed using a
Principal Component Analysis with Varimax rotation (see Table 1). The analysis yielded a
four-factor solution, explaining 57% of the variance. All items loaded clearly on one factor
each, except for two items with substantial loadings on two factors. Factor 1 comprised four
items that referred to the reporting of (1) all earned money, (2) cash-in-hand money, (3)
salary and wages and (4) honorariums, etc. This factor may thus be termed tax compliance
with regard to remuneration Income. Items 3 and 4, however, also each had a substantial
cross-loading on the second factor. These may be attributable to the fact that the two items
were measured in one block together with the following five items, using a shared response
format (see appendix). Regarding their content, the two items seemed to better fit factor 1 as
defined above. Rather than using only the first two unambiguous items, a four-item measure
was maintained for reasons of conceptual plausibility and higher internal consistency (α =
.62).2 Factor 2 comprised five items concerning the declaration of (1) eligible termination
payments, (2) Australian government allowances, (3) Australian government pensions, (4)
interest and (5) dividends. This factor thus referred to tax compliance in the declaration of
non-remuneration Extra Income (α = .78). Factor 3 was defined by two items referring to
                                                          
2 A score for Income noncompliance based only on the two unambiguous items yielded basically the
same results in the regression analyses as the four-measure construct.
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exaggerations or confidence in the legitimacy of ones deduction claims. The factor thus
reflects compliance in Deduction claims (α = .51). Factor 4 comprised three items: Two
measures asked about ones general efforts to plan ones financial affairs and minimise tax.
The third item was defined as the number of specific given tax minimisation strategies
respondents said they used. This factor thus reflects the use of Tax Minimisation strategies
(α = .62). For each factor, indicators were averaged to obtain compound indicators for the
four factors. In cases where indicators of the same construct differed in their response
formats, items were first standardised and then averaged.
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Table 1: Factor analysis of measures of tax compliance
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
Income .81
Cash Income .74
Salary, wages .59 (.45)
Honorariums, allowances, tips, bonuses,
directors fees
.42 (.52)
Eligible termination payments .73
Australian government allowances like Youth
Allowance, Austudy, Newstart
.76
Australian government pension. superannuation
Pensions, and other government pensions and
annuities
.74
Interest .57
Dividends .73
Exaggeration of deductions .76
Illegitimacy of deduction .79
Effort on tax minimisation .78
Looked at ways to minimise tax .82
Various strategies on tax minimisation .65
Explained variance (%) 13 22 10 13
Note. Principal Component Analysis, Varimax rotation. Only factor loadings ≥ .4
are displayed; cross-loadings are given in brackets.
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Self-interest and justice variables
A factor analysis was also used to test for the assumed conceptual differentiation between
self-interest and justice variables (see Table 2). The analysis yielded a five-factor solution
explaining 63% of the variance. All items loaded as anticipated on their respective factors.
Indicators of the same construct that differed in their response formats were standardised
before they were averaged to obtain compound indicators for the five factors Deterrence (α =
.85), Outcome Favourability (α = .76), Procedural Justice (α = .90), Distributive
(Micro)Injustice (α = .74) and Macro-Injustice (α = .58). The interrelations and descriptive
statistics (where measures were not based on standardised indicators) of all the constructs are
given in Table 3.
Predicting tax compliance
Hierarchical regression analyses were applied to test the theoretical predictions. In a first
step, the background variables Sex, Age, Personal Income and Family Income were used as
predictors to control for demographic differences between respondents. In a second step,
self-interest, justice and identification variables were introduced as predictors to test for
main effects as predicted in hypotheses 1, 2a, 3a and 4a. In a third step, all product terms of
self-interest and justice variables with the inclusive identification measure were introduced
as predictors to test for interaction effects as predicted in hypotheses 2b, 3b and 4b. The
results of step 3, however, are only considered when the introduction of the product terms
led to a significant increase in explained variance; otherwise, we refer to step 2 for the
statistics of possible main effects (Cohen & Cohen, 1975). To reduce problems of
multicollinearity due to the use of interaction terms, all predictor variables were standardised
before the product terms were built. Together with a standardised criterion, this procedure
also produced the appropriate standardised solution (reported here), even though the
constants were non-zero (Aiken & West, 1991).
As discussed earlier, the measure for Distributive Injustice was bipolar, ranging from
unfairly disadvantaged to unfairly advantaged, with perceived fairness as the midpoint of the
scale. An effect of perceived justice independent from perceived favourability would be
reflected in a curvilinear relationship with tax compliance. Therefore, the square of the
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standardised measure was considered the true indicator of Distributive Injustice effects and,
as such, introduced as a predictor in step 2, next to the original measure that controlled for
linear effects of favourability. The hierarchical regression procedure was applied to all four
indicators of tax compliance.
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Table 2: Factor analysis of measures of self-interest and justice
                                                                                                                                                      
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5
                                                                                                                                                       
Deterrence-Cash .92
Deterrence-Deductions .92
Agreement with decisions .83
Favourability of decisions .82
Tax Office (TO) respects individuals rights .65
TO is concerned about protecting rights .77
TO considers average citizens concerns .80
TO cares about position of taxpayers .74
TO tries to be fair when making decisions .72
TO gives equal consideration to views .66
TO gets information necessary for decisions .57
TO is generally honest with taxpayers .63
TO consults widely about changes .69
TO goes to great length to consult .67
Fairness of ones own tax burden .82
Fairness of tax burden of industry group .85
Fairness of tax burden of people in the same boat .70
Standard deviation of fairness ratings across groups .63
Government spending for various selected areas .83
Global satisfaction with government spending .58
Explained variance (%) 9 9 26 10 8
                                                                                                                                                       
Note. Principal Component Analysis, Varimax rotation; only factor loadings ≥ .4 are
displayed.
Table 3: Intercorrelations and summary statistics
Variable                              M         SD       N            1             2             3             4             5             6             7             8             9             10      
1. Income [1; 2] 1.05 .14 1621 
2. Extra Income [1; 2] 1.03 .12 1567 .39*** 
3. Deductions n/a n/a 1612 .29*** .34*** 
4. Tax Minimisation n/a n/a 1650 .07** .08** .13*** 
5. Incl. Identification [1; 2]1.87 .33 1968 .05* .11*** .07** .01 
6. Deterrence [1; 100] 47.28 26.27 1897 .14*** .09*** .16*** .10*** .15*** 
7. Outcome Fav. [1; 5] 3.67 1.02 1923 .11*** .05* .10*** .09*** .10*** .06** 
8. Procedural Justice [1; 5]3.11 .66 1998 .02 .06* .01 .04 .12*** .10*** .48*** 
9. Distrib. Injustice [1; 5] 2.64 .66 1976 .03 .04 .07** .02 .04 .04 .18*** .28*** 
10. Distrib. Inj. Squared n/a n/a 1976 .02 .00 .02 .04 .02 .01 .20*** .21*** .32*** 
11. Macro- Injustice n/a n/a 2035 -.00 .04 .01 .01 .01 .07** .21*** .39*** .27*** .27***
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Note. Means for compound measures based on standardised indicators (originally with different scales) are not meaningful and not reported.
Possible scale ranges, again only where applicable, are given in square brackets. Higher scores indicate greater non-compliance, identification,
deterrence, outcome favourability, procedural justice and distributive injustice (for Distrib. Inj. Squared and Macro-Injustice), respectively.
p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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Income reporting
For non-compliance in reporting ones Income, the regression analysis explained a
significant portion of variance in steps 1 and 2, while the interaction terms introduced in step
3 did not further contribute significantly to the prediction of non-compliance (see Table 4).
Focusing therefore on step 2, first of all, three of the background variables had a significant
impact. Age had a negative impact (β = .15; p < .001), reflecting that in particular younger
respondents reported they were less compliant and more likely to under-report their income.
The effect of sex (β = .11; p < .001) means that male respondents reported greater under-
reporting of income than females. Personal Income also had a negative effect (β = .14; p <
.001), indicating that respondents with a lower income of this kind were less compliant and
reported their income less correctly than respondents with higher income. Furthermore, there
were significant negative effects of the two self-interest variables, Deterrence (β = .14; p <
.001) and Outcome Favourability (β = .12; p < .001). In accordance with hypothesis 2a,
perceived deterrence increased compliance; and respondents were more compliant with
regard to income reporting, the more favourable to themselves they perceived Tax Office
decisions to be. None of the justice or identification variables had a significant impact on
this form of tax compliance. The only other significant effect was a positive effect (β = .06;
p = .041) of the original bipolar measure of Distributive Injustice that should not be
interpreted. (It was included in the analysis merely to control for a linear effect in the
squared measure and, if anything, could be regarded as another indicator of outcome
favourability.)
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Table 4: Hierarchical regression analyses for tax non-compliance in reporting of
income
                                                                                                                                                       
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
                                                                                                                                                                                  
R² .036 .071 .076
R²change .035 .005
Fchange (dfs) 12.49 (4, 1323) 7.07 (7, 1316) 1.12 (6, 1310)
Sig. Fchange                                    .000                             .000                             .350              
                                                                                                                                                       
                                                      β               p                 β               p                 β               p      
Age .15 .000 .12 .000 .12 .000
Sex .11 .000 .09 .001 .09 .001
Personal Income .14 .000 .15 .000 .15 .000
Family Income .00 ns .01 ns .01 ns
Identification .02 ns .02 ns
Deterrence .14 .000 .14 .000
Outcome Fav. .12 .000 .12 .000
Procedural J. .04 ns .04 ns
Distributive. Inj. .06 .041 .07 .024
Distrib. Inj. Squared .01 ns .02 ns
Macro-Injustice .05 ns .05 .098
Id.✕Deterrence .04 ns
Id.✕Outcome Fav. .03 ns
Id.✕Proc. J. -.02 ns
Id.✕Distr. Inj. .01 ns
Id.✕D. Inj. Squared .02 ns
Id.✕Macro-Injustice .03 ns
                   (Constant)               .02             ns             .02             ns             .03             ns      
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Reporting of extra income
For non-compliance in reporting Extra Income, all three steps of the regression analysis
explained significant portions of variance. Thus we focus on the most complete third step
(see Table 5). Personal Income was the only background variable that had a significant effect
(β = .08; p = .034); it indicates that again respondents with lower income reported being
less compliant and less truthful about their extra income. Given the significant interaction
effects in which these variables were also involved, significant first-order effects of the self-
interest and justice variables may be understood as average effects across levels of
inclusive identification (Aiken & West, 1991). Specifically, Deterrence had a significant
negative inhibitory effect on non-compliance (β = .07; p = .014). Likewise, Outcome
Favourability was negatively related to under-reporting of extra income (β = .09; p = .004).
These two effects were in line with hypothesis 2a. Procedural Justice had a significant
positive effect (β = .12; p < .001), contrary to hypothesis 3a that perceptions of procedural
justice would decrease non-compliance. Inclusive Identification also had a significant overall
effect (β = .12; p < .001); in accordance with hypothesis 1, respondents who identified
more rather than less strongly with Australians reported being more compliant.
However, all these effects would need to be considered in the light of relevant interaction
effects. First, the effect of Deterrence was significantly moderated by level of Inclusive
Identification (β = .09; p = .004), as predicted in hypothesis 2b. A simple slope analysis (see
Aiken & West, 1991) showed that Deterrence decreased non-compliance for respondents
who identified less with the inclusive category (β = .16), but not for those highly identified
(β = .02).3 Paralleling this finding, there was a significant positive interaction effect of
Outcome Favourability and Inclusive Identification (β = .08; p = .004). In line with
hypothesis 2b, respondents who identified less with Australians were more compliant when
decisions of the tax authority were favourable to them, but not so the highly identified
respondents (simple slopes: .18 vs. .01).
                                                          
3 All simple slopes reported in the present paper were calculated for levels of 1 versus +1
standard deviation of Inclusive Identification.
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There was further an interaction effect of perceived Procedural Justice and Inclusive
Identification (β = .09; p = .006), in line with hypothesis 3b. More precisely, however, for
highly identified respondents this effect only buffered the unexpected positive average
effect of Procedural Justice on non-compliance, while the positive effect remained for less
identified respondents (simple slopes: .03 vs. .12). So, while the direction of the interaction
effect is in line with the hypothesis, Procedural Justice had no overall positive effect for the
highly identified. Moreover, the squared measure of perceived Distributive Injustice was
related to greater non-compliance for those strongly identified as Australians, but not so for
those less identified with Australians (interaction effect: β = .03; p = .047; simple slopes: .05
vs. .01); this finding supported hypothesis 4b.
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Table 5: Hierarchical regression analyses for tax non-compliance in
reporting of extra income
                                                                                                                                                       
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
                                                                                                                                                       
R² .008 .038 .059
R²change .030 .021
Fchange (dfs) 2.44 (4, 1287) 5.85 (7, 1280) 4.70 (6, 1274)
Sig. Fchange                                    .045                             .000                             .000              
                                                                                                                                                       
                                                      β               p                 β               p                 β               p      
Age .04 ns .03 ns .02 ns
Sex .04 ns .04 ns .03 ns
Personal Income .09 .017 .09 .014 .08 .034
Family Income .01 ns .02 ns .02 ns
Identification .11 .000 .12 .001
Deterrence .07 .019 .07 .014
Outcome Fav. .10 .001 .09 .004
Procedural J. .14 .000 .12 .000
Distributive. Inj. .02 ns .03 ns
Distrib. Inj. Squared .01 ns .02 ns
Macro-Injustice .03 ns .04 ns
Id.✕Deterrence .09 .004
Id.✕Outcome Fav. .08 .004
Id.✕Proc. J. .09 .006
Id.✕Distr. Inj. .04 ns
Id.✕D. Inj. Squared .03 .047
Id.✕Macro-Injustice .00 ns
                   (Constant)               .02             ns             .01             ns             .03             ns      
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Deductions
For non-compliance in Deduction claims, all three steps of the regression analysis explained
significant portions of variance, so that we focus on step 3 again (see Table 6). Out of the
four background variables, Age had a significant effect (β = .11; p < .001), indicating that,
as for Income, younger respondents reported being less compliant and less truthful in their
deduction claims. Sex had a close to significant effect (β = .05; p = .054), with male
respondents again reporting less compliance than females.
Inclusive Identification had a negative average effect (β = .07; p = .034), in line with
hypothesis 1. Respondents strongly inclusively identified reported being more compliant.
Deterrence again had a significant negative effect (β = .15; p < .001); this effect was not
further moderated by the interaction with Inclusive Identification and constituted evidence
for hypothesis 2a rather than hypothesis 2b. However, the findings for the other self-interest
variable supported the more specific hypothesis 2b. As was the case for Extra Income, the
interaction effect involving Outcome Favourability was significant and positive (β = .06; p <
.043). Respondents who identified less rather than more strongly with Australians were more
outcome-oriented because they were more compliant when tax decisions were in their favour
(simple slopes: .15 vs. .04).
Moreover, perceived Procedural Justice was related to greater tax compliance only for
respondents who identified strongly with Australians, whereas it was rather positively related
to non-compliance for the less identified (interaction effect: β = .11; p < .001; simple
slopes: .08 vs. .03); this result supported hypothesis 3b. Similarly, the close to significant
interaction effect involving the squared Distributive Injustice measure (β = .03; p = .054)
reflects the finding that perceived distributive justice was related to greater compliance for
those strongly identified as Australians, but not so for less identified respondents (simple
slopes: .04 vs. .02). This result paralleled the finding for Extra Income and supported
hypothesis 4b. There was no significant effect involving perceptions of Macro-Injustice.
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Table 6: Hierarchical regression analyses for tax non-compliance in deduction claims
                                                                                                                                                       
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
                                                                                                                                                       
R² .020 .055 .071
R²change .035 .016
Fchange (dfs) 6.57 (4, 1316) 7.09 (7, 1309) 3.76 (6, 1303)
Sig. Fchange                                    .000                             .000                             .001              
                                                                                                                                                       
                                                      β               p                 β               p                 β               p      
Age .14 .000 .11 .000 .11 .000
Sex .07 .013 .05 .054 .05 .054
Personal Income .05 ns .06 ns .05 ns
Family Income .00 ns .02 ns .01 ns
Identification .02 ns .07 .034
Deterrence .16 .000 .15 .000
Outcome Fav. .11 .001 .09 .003
Procedural J. .04 ns .03 ns
Distributive. Inj. .04 ns .06 .041
Distrib. Inj. Squared .00 ns .01 ns
Macro-Injustice .04 ns .04 ns
Id.✕Deterrence .00 ns
Id.✕Outcome Fav. .06 .043
Id.✕Proc. J. .11 .001
Id.✕Distr. Inj. .03 ns
Id.✕D. Inj. Squared .03 .054
Id.✕Macro-Injustice .01 ns
                   (Constant)               .03             ns             .03             ns             .03             ns      
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Tax minimisation
For measures of Tax Minimisation, steps 1 and 2 of the regression analysis accounted for a
significant portion of the variance explained, while the interaction terms introduced in step 3
did not (see Table 7). We therefore focus on step 2. The positive impact of Age (β = .11; p =
.001) indicates that, in contrast to compliance in deduction claims and income reporting,
older respondents reported they were less compliant and more likely to minimise their tax.
Personal Income as well as Family Income were both positively related to tax minimisation
(β = .13; p < .001 and β = .17, p < .001, respectively). In contrast to the findings for Income
and Extra Income, respondents with higher Personal Income or higher Family Income
reported using tax minimisation strategies to a greater extent than lower income respondents.
The only other significant predictor was Outcome Favourability; its negative effect (β = 
.11; p < .001) supported hypothesis 2a. When respondents perceived tax decisions to be in
their favour, they were less likely to use tax minimisation strategies.
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Table 7: Hierarchical regression analyses for tax minimization
                                                                                                                                                       
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
                                                                                                                                                       
R² .075 .089 .091
R²change .014 .002
Fchange (dfs) 27.20 (4, 1340) 2.94 (7, 1333) .53 (6, 1327)
Sig. Fchange                                    .000                             .005                             .784              
                                                                                                                                                       
                                                      β               p                 β               p                 β               p      
Age .09 .004 .11 .001 .11 .000
Sex .04 ns .03 ns .03 ns
Personal Income .13 .000 .12 .001 .13 .001
Family Income .17 .000 .16 .000 .16 .000
Identification .02 ns .03 ns
Deterrence .04 ns .04 ns
Outcome Fav. .11 .000 .11 .001
Procedural J. .02 ns .02 ns
Distributive. Inj. .05 ns .05 ns
Distrib. Inj. Squared .02 ns .02 ns
Macro-Injustice .04 ns .04 ns
Id.✕Deterrence .04 ns
Id.✕Outcome Fav. .03 ns
Id.✕Proc. J. .01 ns
Id.✕Distr. Inj. .02 ns
Id.✕D. Inj. Squared .00 ns
Id.✕Macro-Injustice .00 ns
                   (Constant)               .02             ns             .04             ns             .05             ns      
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Discussion
The present study used a survey methodology to study the impact of self-interest and justice
perceptions on self-reported tax compliance, with a particular focus on the moderating role
of inclusive identification. The study tested predictions derived from the group value
approach to procedural justice (Tyler et al., 1997) and the categorisation approach to
distributive justice (Wenzel, 2000a, in press) concerning the impact of social identity on
peoples justice motivation versus outcome orientation. The findings of the study speak to
three issues, namely (1) the phenomenon of tax compliance, (2) theories of justice
motivation and (3) theory and practice of compliance enforcement and regulation.
The phenomenon of tax compliance
The present study yielded evidence to support the necessity of differentiating forms of tax
compliance (Kidder & McEwen, 1989). Both the factor analysis and the differential
regression findings show that tax compliance is not a homogeneous set of behaviours. The
factor analysis differentiated between tax compliance in the reporting of remuneration
income (cash and non-cash), the reporting of extra (non-remuneration) income, claims for
deductions and tax minimisation strategies. The regression analyses showed that some
predictors had different effects depending on the form of compliance investigated. The
findings support the view that forms of tax compliance need to be distinguished conceptually
if we want to better understand and predict this phenomenon (Braithwaite et al., 2001).
Background variables
Regarding the demographic variables considered in this research, sex of respondents
contributed significantly to the prediction of tax compliance in income reporting and
deduction claims, but not the other two forms of tax compliance. The results are consistent
with previous findings that men tend to be less compliant than women (e.g., Kinsey &
Grasmick, 1993; Mason & Calvin, 1978; Porcano, 1988; Vogel, 1974). Further, the present
study revealed negative relationships between respondent age and non-compliance in income
reporting and deduction claims. In line with most earlier findings, older respondents tended
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to be more compliant (e.g., Kinsey & Grasmick, 1993; Mason & Calvin, 1978; Tittle, 1980;
Vogel, 1974). However, other studies found either no relationship between age and tax
compliance (Porcano, 1988), the reverse relationship (Wallschutzky, 1984), or even a
curvilinear relationship (Song & Yarbrough, 1978). Likewise, the present study yielded a
positive relationship between age and non-compliance in terms of tax minimisation. These
findings suggest that the impact of age depends on the specific form of taxpaying behaviour,
which may also account for earlier empirical inconsistencies. For instance, age may be
correlated with different opportunities to avoid tax. Older people may have acquired more
assets that allow for strategies of tax minimisation, whereas younger people are more likely
to be in the workforce and thus have access mainly to strategies of under-reporting of
income and exaggeration of deductions.
The effects for personal income and family income can also be explained in terms of
differential opportunities, although income level is confounded with many other variables
(most notably, the tax rate). Income level was related to greater compliance in terms of
reporting of income and extra income, in line with some previous research (e.g., Clotfelter,
1983). However, respondents with higher personal income or higher family income reported
they would pursue strategies of tax minimisation to a greater extent than did lower income
respondents. This finding supports the intuition that high-status taxpayers have greater
access to such effective but relatively low-risk strategies (Roth et al., 1989). In contrast,
respondents with lower income have to confine themselves to options of under-reporting
income and extra income; importantly, they are also more likely to be recipients of cash
payments and government allowances and thus under-reporting constitutes an available
opportunity.
Self-interest, justice and identity
Regarding the effects of self-interest, justice and identity variables, the regression results
yielded, broadly speaking, two different patterns for the four forms of tax compliance. Non-
compliance with regard to income reporting and tax minimisation were exclusively predicted
by self-interest variables, whereas non-compliance in reporting of extra income as well as
deduction claims were additionally influenced by identification and, interacting with
identification, perceptions of justice. This pattern seems to suggest two kinds of tax non-
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compliance, namely, non-compliance for instrumental reasons and non-compliance out of
protest (similar to what Kidder & McEwen, 1989, called asocial and brokered non-
compliance versus symbolic non-compliance). Income under-reporting and tax minimisation
seem to follow exclusively instrumental considerations. Indeed, both seem to share the
characteristic of not being considered illegitimate at all. Tax minimisation strategies are
often conceived of as legal ways of reducing ones tax, even though not conducive to the
integrity of the tax system. Income under-reporting (in particular, of cash income) is widely
considered a trivial offence, as everybody does it to some extent and as it is widely
accepted in at least certain occupations (Sigala, 1999). Of course, under-reporting is
nonetheless illegal, which might be the reason why it was influenced by perceived
deterrence, while tax minimisation was not. More importantly, however, it seems plausible
that, because tax minimisation and income under-reporting are considered acceptable and
system-inherent behaviour, they are rather determined by opportunity and cost-benefit
calculations and less so by considerations of social responsibility and justice. If they are not
considered illegitimate and system-opposing, they can hardly be acts of protest against the
system and its injustices.
In contrast, under-reporting of extra income and incorrect deduction claims were additionally
determined by social factors; that is, level of inclusive identification and perceptions of
justice. Because extra income (e.g., pensions) is usually more easily traceable than cash
income (as an instance of remuneration income), namely due to the paper trail and the
cooperation between the Tax Office and other government agencies or banks, non-
compliance in extra income would seem a more explicit disagreement with the system and to
require justification to oneself. Also, compared to tax on remuneration income, taxation of
extra income (e.g., interest or government allowances) might be regarded as more unfair
because savings have already been taxed as income, and tax on allowances, it could be
argued, undermines their purpose of alleviating neediness. Hence fairness motivations may
be more relevant for non-compliance in extra income. Likewise, false deduction claims are
not simply an omission of a required behaviour (as is the case for under-reporting), but rather
an explicit lie and attempt to mislead the Tax Office. Again, it would require a justification
or motivation that could be based on the perceived unfairness of the tax system. Thus it
makes sense that non-compliance regarding extra income and deductions are determined
more by social factors and system-related discontent.
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Specifically, for these two forms of non-compliance, the analysis yielded an effect of
inclusive identification. The finding supports the prediction derived from social dilemma
research that inclusive identification promotes cooperation (Brewer & Schneider, 1990).
When people identify with their country, they may view it and its representatives more
positively, have greater trust in its authorities and feel more responsibility for the fate of their
fellow citizens (see Kramer, Brewer & Hanna, 1996). In fact, because they identify with their
group, their sense of self is transformed into a more inclusive one (Turner, Oakes, Haslam &
McGarty, 1994) and, as a consequence, their self-interests are transformed as well to include
the interests and welfare of other members (Brewer, 1991; Morrison, 1997). The interaction
effects between outcome favourability and identification constitute evidence for these more
specific predictions. Concern about individual outcomes impacted on tax compliance only
for respondents who did not identify with their collective; highly identified respondents
seemed to have transcended their concern for personal profits.
For under-reporting extra income, a similar interaction effect between deterrence and
identification emerged, further supporting the theoretical argument. Moreover, this result is
interesting in that it suggests that the effectiveness of deterrence is conditional, although it is
probably the most advocated and certainly the most practised enforcement strategy towards
tax compliance. In fact, on closer inspection of the regression results, for low inclusive
identification (1 standard deviation) the effective regression weight for deterrence is .16,
thus reflecting a substantial deterrence effect. However, for high inclusive identification (+1
standard deviation) the effective regression weight for deterrence is +.02; deterrence appears
ineffective for those highly identified with the inclusive category. This finding may
contribute to a better understanding of the inconsistent results for deterrence effects (see the
discussion earlier). It certainly supports the notion that regulation needs to be more
responsive to the conditions, attitudes and motivations of those to be regulated (Braithwaite
& Braithwaite, 2000). We will return to this issue below.
Likewise, the present research yielded evidence that perceptions of justice can have a
significant impact on tax compliance. More importantly, the findings again might help
resolve some of the inconsistencies of previous research on this issue (see the discussion
earlier). In the present study, justice concerns were only relevant to two out of four forms of
tax compliance. As argued before, it might be the case that only these two forms of tax non-
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compliance are considered deviant behaviour; and as instances of deviance, they require
extra motivation (e.g., legitimate resentment due to felt injustice) or, conversely, are
inhibited by considerations of justice or fairness. Further, even in these two cases, the impact
of justice perceptions on tax compliance depended on the respondents degree of
identification with their nation, being the relevant inclusive category in this context. This
leads us to a more general discussion of the nature of justice motivation.
The basis of justice motivation
The finding that perceptions of justice were positively related to tax compliance only for
those respondents who identified strongly with the inclusive category was predicted on the
basis of the group value approach to procedural justice (Tyler et al., 1997) and the
categorisation approach to distributive justice (Wenzel, 2000a, in press) respectively. Both
theories refer to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and self-categorisation theory
(Turner et al., 1987) as their theoretical background. Both argue that concerns for justice are
not simply based on ones motivation to maximise outcomes, through procedures that allow
for some control or through distributions that are in ones favour, respectively; rather, justice
is based on identity processes.
The group value approach argues that people are concerned about procedural justice,
specifically about respectful, unbiased and trustworthy treatment by authorities, because it is
indicative of their inclusion and standing in their social group. It has implications for their
social identity in terms of the category they share with the authorities and within which the
procedures are applied, but only if they regard this category as relevant to their self-
definition (see Tyler & Smith, 1999). Huo et al. (1996) and Smith and Tyler (1996)
demonstrated that procedural justice was related to favourable evaluations of authorities and
their decisions as well as the obligation to obey and follow them, when respondents
identified with the inclusive category.
The present research corroborates these findings and extends them to the area of tax
compliance. Taxpayers were more compliant with tax laws when they identified with
Australians and thought they were treated fairly and respectfully by the tax authorities.
Following the group value approach, we can conclude that taxpayers want to have their
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rights as citizens respected and their voice considered (as much as others voices are
considered) when they identify as citizens of Australia. If their status as Australian citizens is
important to them, they want it to be respected and acknowledged. When authorities convey
such respect and acknowledgement, taxpayers are more compliant irrespective of whether or
not decision outcomes are favourable to them. While the present data supported this
interactive effect of procedural justice and identification, it must be acknowledged however
that procedural justice had an unexpected positive average effect (across levels of
identification) on under-reporting of extra income (for a similar finding, see Porcano, 1988).
It is not clear why this effect occurred. Perhaps procedural fairness induced perceptions of
benevolence and trustworthiness of the Tax Office that let taxpayers anticipate little
punishment for their tax evasion. But then it remains unclear why this should have been the
case for one but not the other forms of tax compliance.
The categorisation approach (Wenzel, 2000a, in press) argues that identity concerns are
likewise the basis of the distributive justice motive. When people identify with the inclusive
category that defines the boundaries of the allocation problem and includes all potential
recipients, they may respond in two ways. They either want to be treated equally to others, as
this acknowledges the inclusion and identity they share with other members, or they want the
inclusive category to be differentiated, and members to be differentially treated, along
dimensions which they consider important value dimensions of that category and defining
attributes of their identity. So, irrespective of the specific content of the distributive justice
notions, inclusive identification drives the motivation to see these justice notions realised.
Because entitlements are derived from the inclusive category membership, violation of
entitlements may lead to social protest due to injustice felt, if there is sufficient identification
with the inclusive category (Wenzel, 2000a).
Previous empirical findings, however, were not always consistent with this view. For
instance, Tyler (1994) and Smith and Tyler (1996) argue and provide evidence that
distributive justice was more strongly based on instrumental concerns and self-interest, while
procedural justice was mainly based on relational and identity concerns (as just discussed).
In contrast, Wenzel (2000a) reports evidence for the categorisation approach in a study
following the reunification of Germany.  East Germans who identified more rather than less
strongly as Germans felt entitled to a better economic situation (i.e., more equal to the West
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German one); and those East Germans who felt that their entitlements were violated and
identified strongly as Germans showed more signs of social protest. However, there was no
evidence for the equivalent interaction effect involving procedural justice, as the group value
approach would have predicted. This could have been due to the specific political context of
the study (Wenzel, 2000a). The present research now yielded evidence for both the group
value approach and the categorisation approach to distributive justice.
While Smith and Tyler (1996) collapsed measures of distributive justice and instrumental
evaluations, on the one hand, and measures of procedural justice and relational evaluations
on the other, the present study went to great lengths to separate aspects of outcome
favourability and distributive justice. It used separate predictors of outcome favourability to
partial out their effects, and tested for curvilinear effects of the bipolar distributive justice
measure while controlling for linear effects (of favourability). Perhaps as a consequence of
this careful procedure, the present study yielded evidence for the categorisation approach.
When taxpayers considered their tax burden to be unfair and they identified with the
inclusive category, they reported less compliant taxpaying behaviour (in terms of extra
income under-reporting and deduction claims).
However, predictions were not confirmed for the macro-aspect of distributive justice.
Indeed, there were no statistically significant effects for perceived macrojustice at all. We
might conclude that the respondents in our study were less concerned about macrojustice
issues (and, as a consequence, there could be no support for the categorisation approach).
However, it might also be the case that the operationalisation of macrojustice in the present
study was suboptimal, had a considerable overlap with self-interest and was not as precise as
the measure of microjustice. First, one of the two aspects of macrojustice addressed in this
study did not explicitly ask about justice, but rather ones satisfaction with or preferences for
government spending. Taxpayers might base their spending preferences on the extent to
which they personally profit from various budget items (Sears & Citrin, 1982). Thus
satisfaction is not the same as feelings of justice and may rather involve aspects of outcome
favourability; the same problem applies to a number of earlier studies (e.g., Alm et al., 1993;
Alm, McClelland & Schulze, 1992). Unlike the case of distributive microjustice, there were
no specific controls for the impact of self-interest. Second, the measure of vertical injustice
(i.e., individual standard deviations of bipolar justice judgments for tax burdens of different
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societal groups) might have been a too subtle measure, less transparent to respondents and
thus more difficult for them to consciously express their opinion with. Further research is
required to clarify the role of macrojustice for tax compliance and the psychological basis of
macrojustice concerns.
Compliance enforcement and regulation
Concerning practices of enforcement and theories of regulation in general, the present
findings clearly suggest that there are alternatives to deterrence and material incentives
(Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Scholz, 1998; Smith & Stalans, 1991). In fact, the results show
that, for certain forms of compliance, deterrence may be effective only for taxpayers who do
not identify with the inclusive category. Likewise, outcome favourability could be
considered a proxy to material incentives, because taxpayers for whom the tax decisions
were favourable had an incentive to comply with and support the tax system. Again, with
even more convincing evidence than for deterrence, outcome favourability (i.e., material
profitability) worked in certain cases only for those taxpayers who did not identify with their
country or nation. Importantly, the segment of less identified taxpayers was clearly a
minority. Thus conventional enforcement strategies of deterrence and material incentives
seem to work only for a minority of taxpayers. It appears that deterrence and incentives may
be effective only for taxpayers who do not identify with the system and its authorities,
perceive a social rift between regulators and themselves and disengage with the authorities
(Braithwaite, 1995; Braithwaite & Braithwaite, 2000). In contrast, the majority of taxpayers
who feel some kind of shared identity with the authorities seem to be more concerned about
justice of the tax system and fairness of their treatment, irrespective of material
consequences.
In order to advance more cooperative regulatory strategies built on a system of consensual
justice notions, we can derive the following suggestions from the present findings. First,
perceptions of justice and fairness played a role for only two of the four forms of tax
compliance, namely, those two forms that were more clearly illegal, illegitimate and
unacceptable. Hence regulators must clearly define certain taxpaying behaviour as illegal;
and they must use social norms and informal beliefs to convey that such behaviour is
illegitimate, unacceptable and irresponsible. Or, given that norms become effective through
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how they are perceived (rather than as they truly are), regulators might have to correct for
misperceptions of relevant social norms (Wenzel, 2001a, 2001b).
Second, perceptions of justice and fairness affected taxpaying behaviour positively only
when there was sufficient identification with the inclusive category (and thus its
representatives). Hence the regulators must build a cooperative relationship with the
regulatees; they must gain sympathy, respect and trust, and build on a consensual
understanding of shared goals and values. Clearly, such a relationship is difficult to shape, in
particular by a governmental enforcement agency like the Tax Office that is often seen
almost through a party-political lens. However, there is scope for managing a better
relationship. In this context, it must be stressed that the theoretical analysis presented in this
paper focused on only one causal direction out of a possibly more complex and cyclical web
of causal relationships. Justice motivations may not only follow from inclusive
identification; rather, the satisfaction of these motivations may increase inclusive
identification. For instance, the group value approach (Tyler et al., 1997; Tyler & Lind,
1990) assumes that procedurally fair treatment increases feelings of inclusion and
identification with the inclusive category and its authorities. Similarly, the categorisation
approach (Wenzel, 2000b) assumes that, while entitlements are deduced from the inclusive
category, treatment in accordance with entitlements induces self-categorisation in terms of
the category from which the entitlements are derived. These propositions need to be tested in
future research, preferably with longitudinal designs.
Third, regulators must nurture the regulatees feelings of justice and fairness. They must
treat regulatees with dignity and respect, consult widely and equally for their opinions, and
demonstrate that regulatory actions ultimately aim at the integrity and fairness of the tax
system and are thus to the benefit of the collective. While it seems easier to accomplish
procedural fairness in the tax arena, views about the substantial distributive justice of the tax
system will always differ between groups of taxpayers. This fact, however, cannot be taken
as an excuse for not pursuing the ideal of a consensually just tax system; it rather demands a
constant discourse about the fairness of the tax system.
The present research certainly has limitations, in particular due to its survey methodology;
these problems need not be repeated here (e.g., Hessing, Elffers & Weigel, 1988). It needs to
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be emphasised though that the correlational data do not permit causal interpretations.
Wherever in the present paper findings were put in terms of causal directionality, such
interpretations stem from the surplus of the underlying theory, but cannot be inferred from
the data. A further problem of the study appears to be the general weakness of effects and the
modest amount of variance explained. Part of the problem is certainly the small variation in
the dependent variables, as the large majority of respondents stated that they were compliant
and cooperative taxpayers. Part of the problem may also be the fact that self-report measures
are burdened with social desirability tendencies and, in this case, perhaps the actual fear of
being identified and targeted as a consequence of ones answers, detracting from the validity
of the measures.
However, the present research did not intend to speak directly to practical implications but
rather address theoretical questions. In this respect, the study yielded some significant and
instructive findings. Our confidence in the reliability and validity of the results is
furthermore reinforced by the fact that the findings replicated earlier preliminary analyses
based on the first half of the sample (Wenzel, 2000c). Overall, the present study encourages
a strongly theory-driven analysis of compliance and regulation processes that acknowledge,
beyond our widely shared materialism, human concerns for fairness, justice and identity.
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APPENDIX
This appendix contains a complete list of the measures used for the various sub-concepts of
tax compliance and justice. It details also the original scale formats and the recoding of the
data if applicable.
Tax compliance
Income
As far as you know, did you report all the money you earned in your 199899 income tax
return? (1 = yes, 2 = no)
Have you worked for cash-in-hand payments in the last 12 months? By cash-in-hand we
mean cash money that tax is not paid on. (1 = yes, 2 = no; reverse-coded)
People earn income from many different sources, [] Think about each of the sources of
income listed below and select the response that best describes your 199899 income tax
return. (1 = received none, 2 = did not declare it, 3 = declared some, 4 = declared most, 5 =
declared all; recoded into 1, 2, 2, 2 and 1 respectively): (1) Salary, wages; (2) Honorariums,
allowances, tips, bonuses, directors fees.
Extra income
The previous question was continued for: (3) Eligible termination payments; (4) Australian
government allowances like Youth Allowance, Austudy, Newstart; (5) Australian
government pension, superannuation pensions, and other pensions and annuities; (6) Interest;
(7) Dividends.
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Deductions
As far as you know, did you exaggerate the amount of deductions or rebates in your 1998
99 income tax return? (1 = a lot, 2 = quite a bit, 3 = somewhat, 4 = a little, 5 = not at all;
reverse-coded)
Think of the deductions and rebates you claimed in your 199899 income tax return. Would
you say you were  (1 = absolutely confident that they were all legitimate, 2 = a bit
unsure about some of them, 3 = pretty unsure about quite a lot, 4 = havent a clue, someone
else did it; recoded into 1, 2, 2 and 2 respectively)
Tax minimisation
Some people put in a lot of effort to plan their financial affairs in order to legally pay as
little tax as possible. How much effort did you or your family devote to this objective in
preparing for your 199899 income tax return? (1 = a lot, 2= quite a bit, 3= some, 4 = a
little, 5 = none; reverse-coded)
In preparing for your 199899 income tax return, did you look at several different ways of
arranging your finances to minimise your tax? (1 = yes, 2 = no; reverse-coded)
Below is a list of investment strategies that may provide for tax minimisation. In preparing
for your 199899 income tax return, were you able to minimise your tax through  (1)
Negative gearing (property/shares), (2) Employee share arrangements, (3) Salary packaging,
(4) Superannuation planning, (5) Warrants or leveraged investments, (6) Schemes to convert
income into capital gains, (7) Tax shelters, e.g. film schemes, agricultural schemes, (8) Off-
shore tax havens or other international tax planning (each with the response options yes, no,
dont know what that is; coded as 1, 0 and 0 respectively, and averaged over all
minimisation strategies).
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Deterrence
Under-reporting of cash
Imagine yourself in this situation. You have been paid A$5000 in cash for work that you
have done outside your regular job. You dont declare it on your income tax return. (A)
What do you think the chance are that you will get caught? (1 = about zero [0%], 2 = about
25%, 3 = about 50%, 4 = about 75%, 5 = almost certain [100%]). (B) If you did get caught,
what are the chances that you would have to face the following legal consequences? (a)
Taken to court + pay a substantial fine + pay the tax you owe with interest; (b) taken to court
+ pay the tax you owe with interest; (c) pay a substantial fine + pay the tax you owe with
interest; (d) pay the tax you owe with interest (with the same percentage scale for each
item). (C) Look at these legal consequences again. How much of a problem would they be
for you? (a) (b) (c) (d) (1 = no, 2 = small, 3 = medium, 4 = large). The deterrence score is
defined as A*(Ba*Ca+Bb*Cb+Bc*Cc+Bd*Cd)/4.
Exaggerations of deductions
Imagine yourself in this situation. You have claimed A$5000 as work deductions when the
expenses have nothing to do with work.  The questions that followed were the same as for
cash income and the measure was constructed equivalently.
Outcome favourability
How often do you agree with the decisions made by the Tax Office?; How often are the
decisions of the Tax Office favourable to you? (1 = almost never, 5 = almost always).
Procedural justice
Respect
The Tax Office respects the individuals rights as a citizen; The Tax Office is concerned
about protecting the average citizens rights.
Trustworthiness
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The Tax Office considers the concerns of average citizens when making decisions; The
Tax Office cares about the position of taxpayers; The Tax Office tries to be fair when
making their decisions.
Neutrality
The Tax Office gives equal consideration to the views of all Australians; The Tax Office
gets the kind of information it needs to make informed decisions; The Tax Office is
generally honest in the way it deals with people; The Tax Office consults widely about how
they might change things to make it easier for taxpayers to meet their obligations; The Tax
Office goes to great lengths to consult with the community over changes to their system (1
= strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree, for all the
procedural justice items).
Distributive Justice
Micro-injustice
Think about the people who are in the same boat as you when it comes to paying tax. In
your opinion, do they pay ? (1 = much more than their fair share, 2 = a bit more, 3 =
about their fair share, 4 = a bit less, 5 = much more than their fair share). In your opinion,
do the following people/groups pay their fair share of tax? (same response format): (a) You,
yourself; (b) Your industry/occupation group.
Macro-injustice
The previous question also referred to: (3) Workers whose primary income is wage and
salaries; (4) People who make a lot of money from investments; (5) Families earning less
than A$20,000 a year; (6) Families earning less than A$100,000 a year; (7) Owner-managers
of large companies; (8) Senior judges and barristers; (9) Unskilled factory workers; (10)
Tradespeople; (11) Farm labourers; (12) Farm owners; (13) Doctors in general practice
(GPs); (14) Chief executives of large national corporations; (15) Small business owners; (16)
53
Tax agents and advisors; (17) Waitresses; (18) Surgeons. The vertical justice measure was
defined as the respondents standard deviation across these items.
The government spends taxpayers money in many different areas. Below are just a few of
these areas. For each area, do you think the government should be spending less money,
keeping things as they are, or spending more money? (1 = much less, 2 = less, 3 = same, 4 =
more, 5 = much more; recoded into 3, 2, 1, 2 and 3 respectively): (1) Education; (2) Defence;
(3) Health care; (4) Law courts and legal aid; (5) Policing; (6) Preventing illegal
immigration; (7) Welfare; (8) Employment; (9) Scientific research; (10) The arts (film,
music, dance); (11) Industry development. Overall, how dissatisfied or satisfied are you
with the way the government spends taxpayers money? (1 = dissatisfied, 5 = satisfied;
reverse-coded).
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